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SUMMARY
InthisDeliverable, westudydatadisseminationinBIONETSfromaDenial-of-Service(DoS)pointofview.
More speciﬁcally, we consider data dissemination as a service provided collaboratively by the U-nodes and
we focus on attacks that aim at denying this service. Our main objective is to identify the main sources of a
potential DoS attack against the data dissemination process and to propose a method to prevent it.
In the ﬁrst part of the Deliverable, we overview the data dissemination approaches introduced by other
work packages in BIONETS. We show that a malicious attacker can degrade the quality of service, but
due to the expected large size of a BIONETS network, a malicious attacker can have an effect only on a
limited portion of the system, and thus, the effect on the quality of the services is also limited. In other
words, due to the inherent redundancy in the system, an adversary can not completely prevent the spreading
of messages. From another point of view, an adversary may inject fake messages into the system which
slows down the dissemination of valid messages (i.e. generate unwanted trafﬁc or spam), however some
anti-spam techniques based content analyzing used in the Internet can be applied by the U-nodes to prevent
the spreading of fake messages and to limit the effect of unwanted trafﬁc.
A potential problem in BIONETS-like networks are that the quality of the service provided by the
system heavily depends on the users’ willingness to cooperate. Particularly, the users may act selﬁshly
meaning that they download messages from other users that are interesting for them, but they deny storing
and distributing messages for the beneﬁt of other users. As potentially every user can be selﬁsh, the effect
of selﬁsh behavior may have a much larger impact on the system than malicious attacks have. In particular,
if the majority of the users behave selﬁshly, then the message delivery rate decreases considerably, and
damages the quality of the service provided by the network.
Therefore, in this Deliverable, we focus on prevention of selﬁsh behavior as the main source of DoS,
and propose a novel data dissemination mechanism that discourages selﬁshness. Our proposed mechanism
is based on the principles of barter. The users trade in messages, meaning that they can download a message
from another user if they also provide a message in return. We analyze our proposed solution using a game
theoretic framework, and show that it indeed discourages selﬁshness. More precisely, the analysis shows
that it is worth for users collecting, carrying and disseminating messages even if they are not interested in
them, which has a positive effect on quality of data dissemination. In particular, the results show that, in
realistic scenarios, the message delivery rate considerably increases if the U-nodes follow the Nash Equi-
librium strategy in the barter mechanism compared to the data dissemination protocol when no encouraging
mechanism is present.
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1 Introduction
The BIONETS network is a special type of opportunistic network where the transfer of messages from their
source to their destination is performed by the intermediate nodes in a store-carry-and-forward manner.
This means that the intermediate nodes carry the messages and pass them on to other intermediate nodes
when they have a connection (e.g., when they are in vicinity).
In this Deliverable, the data dissemination process is viewed as a service, and the Denial-of-Service
(DoS) attacks are directed against the data dissemination. More precisely, an attacker tries to stop or at
least to slow down the message dissemination. This can be directed against a concrete message or for all
the messages. The main objective of this Deliverable is to identify the most vulnerable points of the data
dissemination process in the DoS point of view and to propose a method to prevent it. For this reason, ﬁrst,
we overview the data dissemination processes introduced by other research groups in BIONETS, and than
we propose our mechanism which suits to the requirements addressed in the ﬁrst part of the Deliverable.
There are three types of participant who may cause DoS attack in the system:
² An external adversary has limited access to the network, but it wants to degrade the level of data
dissemination on purpose.
² A malicious node has all the rights that a participant of the network has, but it wants to degrade the
quality of data dissemination.
² A selﬁsh node is an internal node who assists in the data dissemination only if it can increase its
utility.
The rest of the Deliverable is organized as follows. In Section 2, we overview the data dissemination
protocols introduced in the project and we also analyze them from the Denial-of-Service resistance point
of view. This section is divided into three subsections. First, we consider the erasure coding based solu-
tion for reliable data dissemination in Subsection 2.1. This is a general solution, it can rely on any data
dissemination protocols. Than, we consider the data dissemination protocols categorized into two groups:
pairwise connection based and broadcast based solutions, in Sections 2.2 and 2.3, respectively. The problem
of the spam is considered in Section 2.4. After that, in Section 3 we present our proposed data dissemina-
tion mechanism which encourages the U-nodes to store, carry, and forward messages even if they are not
interested in them. Finally, we conclude this Deliverable in Section 4.
2 Analysis of the BIONETS data dissemination mechanisms with re-
spect to DoS
2.1 Data dissemination using erasure codes
Erasure codes were introduced in the context of BIONETS ﬁrst in Deliverable 1.2.1 [1], later in Deliver-
able 2.2.1 [2], and ﬁnally a proposed protocol based on erasure codes is described in Deliverable 1.2.2 [3].
Erasure codes are also called (n;k)-codes, where n denotes the number of generated chunks after encoding
a data (block) and k denotes the number of required chunks to decode the original data. The most important
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property of the erasure codes is that the receiver is able to decode the original data from any k · n of the
chunks.
The beneﬁt of using an erasure code in data forwarding is 1) to strength the reliability of data dissem-
ination [1, 2] in the presence of selﬁsh nodes and 2) to decrease the number of broadcasted packets in an
environment where the participants of the communication vary in time, as detailed in [3]. The latter is
case is out of scope of this Deliverable as it suggests an optimized solution for message delivery from the
T-nodes to U-nodes, but not for the whole data dissemination process.
In the further case, the authors envisioned that a source node disseminates n chunks of a data. The
property that k chunks are enough for any U-node to restore the original data helps to disseminate the data
with high reliability even if selﬁsh U-nodes reject to forward some chunks. Here, the erasure is caused by
the selﬁshness of some U-nodes.
The authors only considered selﬁsh but not malicious nodes. Selﬁsh nodes simply do not forward the
chunks of a valid message, but a malicious node may inject fake chunks into the network which may have
negative impact:
² If a U-node obtains less than k valid and some invalid chunks, he/she will not be able to recover the
original data. Moreover, if there is no redundancy in the original data, the U-node will be not able
to discover the fault. Digital signature using the private key of the source on each chunk can provide
protection against this attack, but it would make the encoding procedure even longer.
² If a malicious node injects into the network k¡1 chunks of random data, the honest and altruistic U-
nodes disseminate the k ¡1 chunks among them without being able to decode the data ever, because
the analysis of k ¡ 1 chunks does not reveal any information about the validity of the original data,
even if the chunks themselves are digitally signed.
2.2 Data dissemination based on pairwise connection
In BIONETS, three point-to-point based data dissemination protocols have been analyzed by looking at
how robust the protocols are when selﬁsh nodes are present in the network with different degree. The
three point-to-point based data dissemination protocols are the epidemic routing [4], two-hop relay [5], and
binary spray-and-wait algorithm [6].
Using epidemic routing, when two U-nodes encounter each other, they exchange the messages stored
in their memory. This algorithm provides low transmission delay, but it wastes the memory and utilizes
high bandwidth. Furthermore, usually the nodes are not able to exchange all the messages, since the con-
nections are assumed to be short-term in BIONETS. The two-hop relay and the spray-and-wait algorithms
correct this defect of epidemic routing mainly with limiting the number of message duplicates. A prede-
ﬁned system parameter (N) determines the largest number of message duplicates stored by the forwarding
nodes. However, the distribution of the message duplicates among the forwarding nodes differs in the two
algorithms:
² Two-hop relay: The source node passes a message to N forwarder nodes, but the forwarders are
allowed to pass the message only to nodes that are directly interested in it.
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² Binary spray-and-wait: A forwarder node passes half of its message copies to each encountered
node that does not have that message. In case, only one copy remains at the forwarder node, the
forwarder node passes that message only to nodes that are directly interested in the message.
In Deliverable 1.3.1 [7], the authors studied the impact of selﬁshness on the message transmission
rate and delay. The selﬁshness means that the nodes reject to download (Type I) or to forward (Type II)
the messages. In the model introduced in Deliverable 1.3.1, every node rejects to cooperate with some
probability.
In Deliverable 1.3.2 [8], the authors assumed that the degree of the cooperation of each node is known
by all other nodes. According to this, the authors proposed an algorithm to select the forwarder nodes to
maximize the delivery rate and to minimize the latency.
The epidemic routing is the most reliable algorithm when selﬁsh nodes are present. However, the main
drawback of this algorithm is the high memory occupancy and the high bandwidth utilization compared
to the other two algorithms. A malicious node can increase the number of unwanted trafﬁc by behaving
like a source of a message and setting the number of message duplicates to the maximum. In the case of
two-hop relay, all the honest nodes become a forwarder of a speciﬁc message who encounters the malicious
node, and in the case of binary spray-and-wait algorithm, all the honest nodes start to disseminate N=2
copies of the message. This kind of malicious behavior decreases the bandwidth, particularly in the case of
the spray-and-wait algorithm where the malicious nodes can forward more copies of the messages to other
nodes than it was deﬁned in the mechanism description.
2.3 Data dissemination based on broadcast techniques
The other group of the data dissemination protocols introduced in BIONETS is based on broadcast tech-
niques. Three of them are from the literature (Scalable Broadcast Algorithm (SBA, [9]), Generic Self-
Pruning [10], HyperGossiping [11]), and two of them are developed in BIONETS (IOBIO [12, 8] , Multi
Message SBA [8]). These protocols are analyzed in Deliverable 1.3.2 [8] with respect to the message
delivery rate and the utilization of the bandwidth.
The main objective of the proposed protocols is to maximize the number of nodes reached with one
broadcasted message, but also to minimize the unnecessary message and broadcast duplicates.
In SBA, the nodes are aware of their 2-hop neighbors. When a node receives a message, it starts a timer
with a random value (within a predeﬁned interval). Every time when the node hears the message, it registers
who else received it. If the timer expires and someone did not receive the message in the neighborhood of
the node, it rebroadcasts the message.
The Multi Message SBA (MMSBA) is extended with some features to be applicable in the BIONETS
network. The nodes have to manage the changing neighborhoods and therefore they have to store the
messages that they have already forwarded.
An adversary in the original SBA can easily prevent the dissemination of a message by broadcasting
false information to its neighborhood. The steps of an adversary are the following: 1) The adversary
collects the ID of two-hop neighbors. This information is sent in HELLO packets by the neighboring nodes
according to the protocol. 2) Broadcasts a fake HELLO packet that claims that all the two-hop neighbors of
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theadversaryareitsone-hopneighbors. 3)Later, whenamessageisbroadcasted, theadversaryimmediately
rebroadcasts it and the neighbors of the adversary register that all their neighbors received the message as
the adversary claimed in the fake HELLO packet. Therefore, they will not rebroadcast the message again,
at all. To be efﬁcient, the adversary has to be near to the source of the message dissemination, otherwise
the message will reach its destination through alternative routes.
When using the MMSBA, the nodes store the messages that they received even if all the known neighbor
obtained them. They rebroadcast a message if they encounter a node which has not received the message
according to the node’s knowledge. In this case, an adversary is less effective.
To measure the effectiveness of the adversary — using SBA or MMSBA — placed at different points,
some further investigations are needed.
In the generic-prune dissemination protocol, the nodes are aware of the subnetwork containing their
k-hop neighbors. The messages are ﬂooded among the nodes, but there is a self-prune mechanism, which
is responsible for minimizing the message duplicates. A node i does not broadcast a message if there is a
route between any node pair (u;v) within the k-hop subnetwork where all the nodes in the route have higher
priority than the node i. The priority is not determined in advance. Its value can be chosen by a protocol
designer. Moreover, the priority is not required to be in connection with any property of the message
dissemination. E.g. the priority in some simulations was the number of neighbors. In this example, an
adversary can claim higher number of neighbors to get higher priority. Note, that an adversary with higher
radio range can get higher priority even if certiﬁcates from the neighbors are required. Furthermore, the
adversary increases the priority of the neighboring nodes. Therefore, the k-hop neighbors will expect to
receive the messages through the route where the adversary is placed. After that, if the adversary rejects to
forward the message, it may have high impact on the message dissemination.
If the priority is based on the ID, an adversary can choose a large ID. However, if the neighbor of
the adversary has a small ID, the other nodes will not prune themselves. Besides, if the priority is based
on the reputation value, a node who rejects to forward messages will have low reputation value and low
priority. Therefore, the choice of the priority value has a large impact on the security level of the message
dissemination protocol. Further investigations are needed to choose the right priority value.
WhennodesdisseminatemessagesaccordingtotheHypergossipingmechanism, theybroadcastHELLO
messages which include the stored messages. If a node detects a large difference between its memory and
the memory reported in the HELLO message, then it rebroadcasts the messages are missing at the other
node. With this mechanism, dissemination of messages are handled well when isolated islands join. How-
ever an adversary can easily persuade the other nodes to rebroadcast all the stored messages with broad-
casted fake HELLO messages that claim that no message is stored in the adversary’s memory. The honest
nodes receiving the fake HELLO message rebroadcast all their messages exhausting their battery. Fortu-
nately, the adversary has only local impact and it can not inﬂuence the nodes out of its radio range.
IOBIO implements a pull approach: ﬁrst a node u broadcast a list of all or a part of the messages that it
stores. If any node v in its neighborhood is interested in a message, the node v sends back a request message
with the ID or IDs of the messages it is interested in. Node u waits until a timer expires and broadcasts the
messages according to the requests.
Similarly to the Hypergossiping, in IOBIO an adversary has only local impact. Moreover, the adversary
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is not able to choose which message will be broadcasted because of the pull mode. It can only force to
make a message broadcasted even if no node is interested in it.
2.4 Spam in BIONETS
An adversary may inject fake messages into the system to slow down the dissemination of valid messages
but with traditional anti-spam techniques based on only local decisions, similar to those used in the Internet,
it is easy to prevent the spreading of fake messages. In the Internet these techniques are less effective than
in BIONETS network, because they are applied in the end systems, and therefore they do not prevent
the increased usage of the bandwidths. In contrast to this, in BIONETS networks, spam ﬁltering can be
implemented by the U-nodes which are not only end systems but forwarding nodes. Thus, unwanted trafﬁc
can be stopped immediately as it enters in the network, and it does not harm the entire system.
Considering some anti-spam techniques [13], the Bayesian distribution ﬁlters [14], statistical compres-
sion models [15], and using regular expressions are the techniques that suit to BIONETS networks. The
common property of these techniques is that the U-nodes can decide locally if a message is spam or not
only analyzing the content of the message.
² The Bayesian distribution ﬁlter algorithm binds a weight for each word in a message. The weights
are adjusted by training the algorithm with spam and good messages. Later, the algorithm marks a
message as a spam if its weight derived from the weights of the words of the message is heavier than
a threshold.
² In case of statistical compression models, the analyzed messages are compressed with both spam and
good-message models. If the message is compressed better with spam model than compressed with
good-message model, the message is marked as spam.
² Widely used techniques are based on regular expressions. The messages are marked as spam if
they match some predeﬁned regular expressions. These expressions can be updated regularly in the
Internet, but these can be updated also in BIONETS networks meeting other trusted U-nodes and
exchanging the regular expression packages.
All these algorithms can be used together with rule-based ranking. In that case, each anti-spam algorithm
gives a score to the messages. After summarizing the scores, the rule-based ranking decides if the massage
should be mark as spam or not.
2.5 Conclusion
In this section, we have shown that a malicious attacker can degrade the quality of service. However, such
an attacker has only local impact in a large scale mobile and distributed network. It is difﬁcult for him to
completely prevent the spreading of messages. From another point of view, an adversary may inject fake
messages into the system to slow down the dissemination of valid messages but with traditional anti-spam
techniques based on local decision, similar to those used in the Internet, it is easy to prevent the spreading
of fake messages.
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A potential problem in BIONETS-like network is that the quality of service provided by the system
heavily depends on the users’ willingness to cooperate. In particular, the users may act selﬁshly mean-
ing that they download messages from other users that are interesting for them, but they deny storing and
distributing messages for the beneﬁt of other users. If the majority of the users behave selﬁshly, then the
message delivery rate decreases considerably, and damages the quality of the service provided by the net-
work. This has also been shown in [16] for the protocols described in Section 2.3. Therefore, a potentially
dangerous source of Denial-of-Service is the proliferation of selﬁsh behavior of the U-nodes. For this rea-
son, we focus on this problem in the rest of this Deliverable. More speciﬁcally, in the next section, we
analyze the problem and introduce a data dissemination mechanism that discourages selﬁshness.
3 Discouraging selﬁsh behavior in data dissemination using barter
In the previous section, we showed that a malicious node is not able to have a large impact on the data
dissemination. Meanwhile, the large number of selﬁsh nodes considerably degrade the quality of data
dissemination service. According to this, we propose a novel data dissemination mechanism resistant to
selﬁsh nodes. More precisely, our proposed mechanism is based on the principles of barter. The users
trade in messages based on barter, and a user can download a message from another user if he/she can
give a message in return. We expect that it is worth for the users collecting messages even if they are not
interested in them. It is beneﬁcial for the users to be able to give new messages to other parties in order
not to skip any messages that the user is interested in. Thus, we expect that as a “side-effect”, the messages
disseminate better in the network.
This section of the Deliverable is organized as follows. In Subsection 3.1, we analyze the system
without any incentives and determine the points where stimulating mechanism should be introduced. In
the same subsection, we introduce the system model that is used to analyze the system with and without
encouragement. We describe our barter based approach in Subsection 3.2, and we also extend the system
model with the barter mechanism. Forthe analysis of the effectsof selﬁsh behaviorin the system augmented
with the barter mechanism, we introduce a game theoretic model in Subsection 3.3. In Subsection 3.4, we
show and interpret the results of the barter game.
3.1 System analysis
In this subsection, we introduce the system model. Because of the complexity of the model, we use simu-
lations instead of analytical tools. We show that there are scenarios where the message delivery has large
latency because the U-nodes are selﬁsh in a sense that they only store and forward messages that they are
directly interested in. The aim of the analysis is twofold: 1) to prove that an incentive is required in the
network to increase the message delivery rate and decrease the message delivery latency, and 2) to give a
reference with which we can compare our subsequent solution.
3.1.1 System model
In our model, the users are placed in an arbitrary ﬁeld. They own devices that have capabilities to commu-
nicate with other devices within their radio range. The used wireless technology can be Bluetooth, Wi-ﬁ
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or any wireless techniques that suits the BIONETS concept. The messages are generated and disseminated
among the devices/users in the considered system, but each user is interested only in a small subset of the
messages. The dissemination process is based on the store-carry-and-forward principle. A user and her
device together is the U-node, and it is assumed that the message destination has no impact on the user’s
movement.
Each message has a type for each U-node. For simplicity, we distinguish only two types: primary
messages and secondary messages. A message is a primary message for a given U-node, if the U-node is
interested in the content of the message and secondary if the U-node is not. Note that a message may have
different types for different U-nodes, as different U-nodes are interested in different contents.
These messages are generated by the T-nodes1. In our system model the time is slotted, and the T-
nodes generate new messages with a ﬁxed average rate, % messages per time step. The T-nodes are static
and each one stores only the most recently generated message, which can be downloaded at the cost of
communication by any U-node that passes by the T-node.
A message has two main properties: the ﬁrst one is the popularity attribute and the second one is the
valueofthemessageovertime. Thepopularityattribute0 < ³ · 1describestheprobabilitythatarandomly
taken U-node is interested in the message. We assume that T-nodes do not generate irrelevant messages,
hence we consider ³ > 0.
Each message has some value for each U-node. The value of a message is determined by its age. For
simplicity, we assume that primary messages of the same age have the same value for the U-nodes. Without
loss of generality, we assume that the value of a primary message at the time of its generation is one unit,
and this is discounted in time, because messages lose their value over time. This is usually the case in the
applications that BIONETS networks are envisioned for. The discounting function ±(t) describes the value
of the messages over time. Obviously, it is difﬁcult or impossible to ﬁnd a discounting function which suits
to each application. Therefore, we deﬁned three different monotone discounting functions. These three
functions are formulated in Equation 1, 2, and 3, and plotted in Figure 1. In the ﬁrst case, the message
value decreases linearly, in the second case, the messages evaluate exponentially, and in the last case, the
messages loose their value suddenly, similarly to a step function.
±0(t) =
(
1 ¡ t
500 if t < 500
0 else
(1)
±1(t) = 0:995t (2)
±2(t) = 1 ¡
1
1 + 1000 ¢ (1 ¡ 1
20)t (3)
When two U-nodes get in the vicinity of each other, they interact in the following way:
1. The U-nodes exchange the list of the messages that they carry. The exchanged lists contain only
the short descriptions of the messages (including their time of generation) rather than the messages
themselves.
2. Each U-node u removes from the list L
(0)
v received from v the messages that are not primary for node
u, and the ones that u already stores in memory getting the list L
(1)
v .
1The results are not signiﬁcantly different if we also allow the U-nodes to generate messages.
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Figure 1: Primary message value
3. Each U-node u determines the value of the messages listed in L
(1)
v based on their ages. Then, each U-
node orders the messages contained in L
(1)
v by their value in descending order. The resulting ordered
list L
(2)
v is the list of messages that u wishes to download from v.
4. U-node u and v download messages from the other party until they get new ones that they are inter-
ested in, or the connection is interrupted because the U-nodes move away from their radio range or
they choose other parties to ﬁnd new messages.
Connections can be interrupted because the U-nodes are moving and they leave the radio range of the
other party. Therefore, in our model, the U-nodes are not able to exchange as many messages as they want
but at maximum one message per time step. Hereby, we assume that a message exchange is completed in
the time step or not started at all.
The assumption that only one message is exchanged per time slot implies that the U-nodes have to
decide carefully which message they want to download in a time step. This can be viewed as an implicit
cost of the system and we think that the effect of the implicit cost is much more important than the effect of
different communication and storage costs. We think that the communication and storage cost is negligible
compared to the value of the messages that a U-node could not download or could but with less information
value. However, we take into account the memory constraints with the following mechanism: the U-nodes
delete the messages from the memory whose value goes below the threshold D, 0 < D < 1.
To measure the message delivery and delivery latency, we deﬁned a formula for the goodput (see For-
mula 4 and 5). The notation is the following considering node i:
² mt
i is the message that U-node i downloaded in time step t
² Tm is the time step when message m was generated
² ± is the discounting function described above
² vi(t) is the gain that U-node i gets in time step t
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The goodput for U-node i is the sum of the gains in each time step normalized with the value that node
i could obtain in the ideal case. In the ideal case, the U-nodes obtain all the messages at the moment of
their generation. At the moment of the generation, the value of the messages is 1 as it is assumed above.
Therefore, the maximum gain of U-node i is the number of generated primary messages (MP
i (t))
A U-node i gets vi(t) (see Formula 4) gain in time step t.
vi(t) = ±(t ¡ Tmt
i) (4)
Gi(t) =
Pt
¿=0 vi(¿)
jMP
i (t)j
(5)
Note that the goodput is time and U-node speciﬁc. However, the goodput is statistically equal if all the
U-nodes behave equally, but it can vary on choosing nodes behaving differently. Goodput also can vary over
time, however we will show in Appendix A that the value of the goodput goes to a steady-state goodput.
Therefore, we will consider the goodput of each U-node i in the steady-state conditions, denoted by Gi.
Gi = lim
t!1
Gi(t) (6)
Note that the maximum goodput is 1, which represents the case when the U-nodes receive all the mes-
sages that they are interested in at the time of their generation. This can be reached only by online networks
which usually require installed infrastructure, operators and payment from the users. This contradicts the
thought of the BIONETS.
3.1.2 Simulations
In our simulations, the ﬁxed-number of U-nodes move in discrete time steps according to one of the two
mobility models: the restricted random waypoint and SUMO (Simulation of Urban MObility, [17]) model.
In the restricted random waypoint model, the U-nodes move on ﬁeld of size 20 £ 20 unit. On the ﬁeld,
there are some special points chosen at random; these are called meeting points. Each U-node selects a
meeting point randomly, and moves towards this meeting point with a ﬁxed speed. When the meeting point
is reached, the U-node stops and stays for randomly chosen time. Then, it chooses another meeting point
and begins to move again. The nodes that happen to be at the same meeting point in the same time step are
paired randomly and these pairs are able to download one message from each other in the above described
way.
SUMO is an open source, realistic road trafﬁc simulator. The vehicles start their movement from a
randomly chosen place and they follow the trafﬁc rules moving towards their destination also chosen at
random in a predeﬁned map. The vehicles move on the simpliﬁed map of Budapest (see Figure 2). The
nodes can communicate with each other when they stop in the intersubsections similarly to the meeting
points in the restricted random waypoint model.
Recall that in our system model, the messages are injected into the network by T-nodes that are static. In
the restricted random waypoint model, the message nodes reside in the meeting points, whereas in SUMO
the message nodes are placed in each intersubsection.
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As we have already described the messages have ³ popularity value. When a T-node generates a new
message in the simulation it determines which U-node is interested in it according to the popularity value.
Thus, the message node sets the message to primary with probability ³ for each U-node.
We summarize the simulation parameters in Table 2.
Table 2: Parameter values for the simulations
Parameter RRW SUMO
Simulation length (time steps) 3000
Number of mobile nodes 300
Number of meeting/cross points 100 60
Number of message nodes 100 60
Message generation rate % 0.01 0.0166
Simulation area 20 £ 20 unit see Fig. 2
Velocity (unit/timestep) 1 -
Probability of leaving a meeting point 0.1 -
While we deﬁned the simulation parameters, we imagined the following scenario in the case of the
restricted random waypoint model: There is a 3-storey building (mall) with 33 rooms (shops) in each storey
and three persons (shoppers) on average and a message node (advertisement unit or seller) in each room,
300 mobile nodes and 100 message nodes in the building. In the case of SUMO mobility model, we also
assumed to have 300 U-nodes, but in the map there is only 60 cross points, hence, 60 T-nodes are placed in
every intersubsection. All the T-nodes generate one new message per time step on average. In the restricted
random waypoint model the U-nodes stay at a meeting point for 10 time steps on average. We determined
the length (number of time steps) of the simulation in an empirical way, and we take into account that the
goodput have to reach the steady-state goodput.
Figure 2: Simpliﬁed map of Budapest used in SUMO mobility model
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Figure 3: Motivation results
We varied some of the parameters to study their effect on the results. As described above during simu-
lation runs we used different functions for message devaluation. Besides this, for the sake of simplicity, we
assumed that during a simulation the messages are generated with one predeﬁned popularity attribute ³, but
more simulations were executed with different ³ values. Recall that 0 < ³ · 1. To reduce the complexity
of our simulations, we use the following values of ³: ³ = 0:05;0:2;0:4;0:6;0:8;1.
The main objective of these initial simulations is to prove that an incentive is required to increase
the message delivery rate and to decrease the message delivery latency. Therefore, we run two kinds of
simulations for every scenario: 1) one to get the goodput when the nodes behave selﬁshly and 2) another one
to get the goodput in an ideal case. In the former case, the U-nodes strictly follow the protocol introduced
in Subsection 3.1. This protocol corresponds to selﬁsh behavior, because U-nodes download only those
messages in which they are interested. In the ideal case, the U-nodes download all the new messages that
they ﬁnd in the memory of the connected node in one time step, both the primary and secondary ones. The
latter case gives an upper bound on the achievable goodput of the U-nodes in the realistic case. Clearly,
this upper bound is different from the theoretical maximum of 1, because the value of a messages decreases
before reaching an interested U-node, if reaches it at all.
In both simulations, the U-nodes behave similarly in the same situation, hence they behave statistically
equally in the whole simulation. Therefore, the goodput of the network is calculated getting the average of
the goodput of each node.
3.1.3 Motivation
Results in the case of the restricted random waypoint model and SUMO can be seen in the Figures 3(a)
and 3(b), respectively. In these ﬁgures, we show simulations where the discounting function is linear (±0),
because the results show minor changes with other message devaluations.
In the ﬁgures, the goodput of the network is plotted against the popularity attribute value of the mes-
sages. To remind the reader, in the simulations in each parameter set, the messages have the same popularity
value. The obtained average goodput is plotted against the popularity values which can be seen on the hor-
izontal axis. The solid line shows the goodput of the network in the ideal case and the line with dashes and
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dots shows the goodput of the network in the selﬁsh case, when the U-nodes does not download secondary
messages.
There are huge differences between the two mobility models. In the case of the restricted random
waypoint model (shown in Figure 3(a)) the goodput is much higher than the one in the SUMO mobility
model (shown in Figure 3(b)). This difference comes from the fact that the U-nodes choose one from
the meeting points uniformly in the RRW case, however in the SUMO mobility model most of the U-
nodes move through the largest intersubsections, whereas the smaller ones are bypassed or quickly crossed
because of the smaller trafﬁc. For this reason, the messages generated at smaller ones are passed to U-nodes
with less probability, and these messages are deleted before spreading in the network. Recall that a message
is deleted by all the carrying nodes if the value of the message goes below a D threshold.
When the U-nodes behave selﬁshly the popularity value has a large impact on the goodput. The more
U-nodes are interested in a message, the more nodes download the message even if all the U-nodes are
selﬁsh. The more U-nodes download a message, the higher is the probability that a U-node will meet one
who has downloaded the required message. We call this selﬁsh carrier effect and it can be seen in the
Figure 3(b), but not clearly in the Figure 3(a). There, the goodput increases with the increasing popularity
until a speciﬁc value, but then the goodput decreases.
The reason for the decrease of the goodput when the popularity increases is the following: The goodput
is a ratio as the Equation 5 shows. As one can see, the denominator (maximum value) can increase till
inﬁnity. While the nominator (obtained value) has an upperbound (even if it is difﬁcult to determine in a
concrete parameter set), because the nodes are able to exchange only one message in each time step.
To conclude the motivation subsection, we can state that the goodput is affected by two mainly indepen-
dent, but opposite effects: the selﬁsh carrier effect and the implicit cost. When the value of the popularity
attribute is 1 the goodput is affected clearly by the implicit cost, whereas when the popularity value is near
to 0 it is affected clearly by the selﬁsh carriers. The implicit cost comes from a property of the system
model, while the selﬁsh carrier effect comes from the selﬁshness of the U-nodes. Therefore, we can state
that an incentive is required to compensate the selﬁsh carrier effect which mainly affects the goodput of the
network when the popularity value of the generated messages is low.
3.2 Our barter based approach
OurapproachtostimulatethecooperationofU-nodesisbasedontheprinciplesofbarter. Morespeciﬁcally,
we require that when two nearby U-nodes establish a connection, they ﬁrst send the description of the
messages that they currently store to each other, and then they agree on which subset of the messages they
want to download from each other. In order to ensure fairness, the selected subsets must have the same
size, and the messages are exchanged in a message-by-message manner, in preference order. If any party
cheats, the exchange can be disrupted, and the honest party does not suffer any major disadvantage (i.e.,
the number of messages downloaded by the honest party is at most one less than the number of messages
downloaded by the misbehaving party).
Note that it is entirely up to the U-nodes to decide which messages they want to download from each
other. They may behave selﬁshly by downloading only those messages that are of primary interest for them.
However, selﬁsh behavior may not be beneﬁcial in the long run. In particular, the idea is that a message
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that is not interesting for a U-node A may be interesting for another U-node B, and A may use it to obtain
a message from B that is indeed interesting for A. In other words, the messages that are secondary for a
U-node still represent a barter value for the U-node, and hence, it may be worth downloading and carrying
them. Hereby, the messages can be viewed as an investment to get new primary messages later.
Recall that the U-nodes did not select the secondary messages from the list of the connected node when
they selected the messages to download in the message exchange protocol introduced in Subsection 3.1.1.
However, when the messages are exchanged according to the principles of barter, as it is mentioned above, it
is worth downloading and carrying secondary messages also, even if the U-nodes are selﬁsh (we will show
that this statement holds). Therefore, the U-nodes need to compare the primary to the secondary messages
when they order the list of the connected node.
Recall that there is no direct beneﬁt of downloading a secondary message. It is worth to download to
exchange later for primary ones. According to this, the value of the secondary messages is considered only
when a node sorts the messages for download from another node. The value of a secondary message at
the time of its generation depends on how the U-node values secondary messages with respect to primary
messages, and it is discounted in the same way as primary messages. In other words, if for a U-node,
secondary messages are worth SP units for some 0 · SP · 1 at the time of their generation, then the
value of a secondary message after t time units is SP ¢ ±(t). SP is called secondary/primary ratio. We
have to emphasize that if SPu = 0 than the U-node u does not download any secondary messages.
Note that in general, the value of a secondary message cannot be larger than the value of a primary
message of the same age (i.e., SP · 1), because the primary message has the same barter value as the
secondary message, and in addition, the U-node is interested in its content. However a speciﬁc secondary
messagewhichismorefreshthanaspeciﬁcprimarymessagemayhavehighervalueanditcanbeexchanged
to primary messages later, which will have higher gain all together.
We adapt the message exchange protocol according to the barter-based approach in the following way:
1. The U-nodes exchange the list of the messages that they carry.
2. Each U-node u removes from the list L
(0)
v received from v the messages that u already stores in
memory, and thereby obtains the list L
(1)
v .
3. Each U-node u determines the value of the messages listed in L
(1)
v based on their types, their ages,
and the secondary/primary ratio SPu as described above. The list obtained in this way is denoted by
L
(2)
v .
4. Each U-node u orders the messages contained in L
(2)
v by their value in descending order. The result-
ing ordered list L
(3)
v is the list of messages that u wishes to download from v.
5. The nodes exchange at most ` = min(jL
(2)
u j;jL
(2)
v j) messages from the beginning of their lists on
a message-by-message manner, where jLj denotes the length of the list L. Thus, the number of
exchanged messages is determined by the length of the shorter list or the duration of the connection.
To provide the circumstances for barter exchange, we assume that the U-nodes offer all their valid and
only valid messages to download. On the one hand, it is not worth for any nodes to hide messages from
other U-nodes, because it may decrease the number of messages that the U-node is allowed to download
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from other U-nodes. On the other hand, we assume that a mechanism is presented in the system that
prevents injecting fake messages with which a greedy U-node can increase the number of messages to
download from other U-nodes. At the end of this section, we extend the barter mechanism with the usage
of anti-spam techniques. With that mechanism, the node are discouraged to generate false messages.
The purpose of our analysis later in this Deliverable is to verify whether the barter based approach
increases the goodput or not.
3.3 Game model
We introduce our proposed mechanism as a game to analyze the behavior of the U-nodes using game theory
[18, 19, 20, 21]. Our objective is to prove that the network can reach high goodput using barter mechanism
even if selﬁsh U-nodes are present.
We deﬁne a non-cooperative game G = [P;fSig;f¼ig]. P is the set of the players, Si denotes the
strategy space of player i 2 P, and ¼i represents the payoff function of each player i. To be more precise ¼i
is the simpliﬁed denotation of ¼i(s0;s1;:::;sjPj), because the payoff of each player depends on the strategy
played by the other players. This can also be denoted by ¼i(si;s¡i) emphasizing the strategy of player i,
where s¡i is the strategy proﬁle of all the players except for player i.
In barter game, the players (P) are the U-nodes, and hence in the rest of this Deliverable, we will
use the player and the U-node notation equally and alternately. The strategy space of each player is the
secondary/primary ratio (SPi 2 S = [0;1]), and each player i 2 P decides which si = SPi strategy she
plays. The players choose their strategies in a way to maximize their goodput. Hence, the steady-state
goodput is the payoff in the barter game.
¼i = Gi (7)
In order to model the behavior of the selﬁsh U-nodes, we introduce the concept of best response and
Nash Equilibrium.
The best response of player i to the proﬁle s¡i is a strategy such that:
Bi(s¡i) = argmax
si2S
¼i(si;s¡i) (8)
If player i plays Bi(s¡i) strategy in game G it reaches the maximum from obtainable payoffs given that
the other players play s¡i.
The pure-strategy proﬁle s¤ is a Nash Equilibrium if the following equation holds for s¤:
s¤
i = Bi(s¤
¡i);8i 2 P (9)
Namely, in Nash Equilibria none of the players can increase their payoff changing their strategy unilaterally.
Symmetric game: G = [P;fSig;f¼i()g] game is symmetric if each player has the same strategy space
(S0 = S1 = ::: = S) and their payoff functions are equal (¼i(si;s¡i) = ¼j(sj;s¡j) for si = sj and
s¡i = s¡j, where i;j 2 P). A symmetric G game can be denoted by [P;S;¼()] tuple.
As one can see, the barter game is a symmetric game, because the strategy space deﬁned in the game is
identical for all players. In our system model the nodes are not distinguished in a sense of their objectives
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or with some special properties. Thus, they can maximize their payoff in the same way and they should get
the same payoff in the same strategy proﬁle.
In the analysis of the barter mechanism we are looking for the Nash Equilibria. We limited ourselves
to ﬁnd only pure strategy, symmetric Nash Equilibria because of two reasons. On the one hand, as the U-
nodes are not aware of decisions of other U-nodes, they are not able to determine which strategy to choose
without additional mechanisms as the strategies are different, and the nodes have to decide which strategy
to choose to follow the Nash Equilibrium. On the other hand we assumed that each U-node is a player,
which would lead to the analysis of a game with a jPj-dimensional strategy space, which is infeasible by
means of simulations.
A symmetric game has a symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium according to paper [22] if the strategy
space is a nonempty, convex and compact subset of some Euclidean space while the function of payoff is
continuous in the strategy and quasiconcave. The strategy space is the interval [0;1], which corresponds
to the conditions of existing symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium. Whereas, the properties of the payoff
function are not veriﬁable, the results of the simulations will show that the conditions hold.
If we expand the Formula 8 and 9 according to the symmetric game and equilibrium, fs¤g is Nash
Equilibrium if the following equation holds for any player i 2 P:
s¤
i = argmax
si2S
¼(s¤
0;s¤
1;:::;si;:::);where s¤
u = s¤
v8u;v 2 P=fig (10)
As one can see, it is easy to verify that a speciﬁc strategy proﬁle fs0g is Nash Equilibria or not. Con-
sidering any player i 2 P — without loss of generality i = 0, called player null — if it is worth to deviate
this player, fs0g is not the pure strategy, symmetric Nash Equilibrium, whereas if s0 is the best response to
player null than s0 will be the best response strategy for all the other players also, as the players have equal
payoff functions.
Therefore, to ﬁnd the symmetric pure-strategy Nash Equilibria is not necessary to examine the whole
jPj-dimensional strategy space, but 2-dimensional is enough. Thus, due to the symmetry of the game, the
analysis is independent of the number of players.
3.4 Results
We run simulations to analyze the efﬁciency of the barter mechanism as we did in Subsection 3.1. The
simulations were executed with the same parameters such that we can compare the barter based mechanism
to the other two analyzed cases: 1) when the messages disseminate ideally and 2) when the nodes download
only primary messages.
As we have already described, the U-nodes do not change their strategy during a game. Therefore, in
each simulation run, the U-nodes play a predeﬁned strategy chosen from discrete values of the strategy
space. The discrete values are the values from 0 to 1 increasing by 0:05.
We run a simulation with a concrete parameter set six times, and we consider the average goodput of
player null. The obtained goodput of the other U-nodes is irrelevant as it is described in Subsection 3.3.
Due to the above described discretization, each U-node’s strategy can take 21 possible values. This
means that we had to run 212 = 441 simulations for each parameter setting in order to ﬁnd the pure
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strategy, symmetric Nash Equilibria. The best response function of some parameter settings can be seen in
Figures 4(a) and 4(b).
In Figure 4, on the vertical axis, there are the strategies that player null can choose, while on the
horizontal axis, the strategy space of the other players is placed. The Nash Equilibrium candidates are the
strategy proﬁles where player null and the other players choose the same strategy; these are denoted by
solid, black points in Figure 4. Whereas, the best response strategy of player null to a speciﬁc strategy
proﬁle of the other players is denoted by empty circles. E.g. in Figure 4(a) player null can get the highest
payoff if its strategy is 0:15 mainly independently from other player’s strategy. According to this, the Nash
Equilibria is the strategy set where all the nodes play with strategy 0:15. The quasi deterministic best
response appear in all parameter sets sometimes with different strategy, this is why we presented only two
of them: one with the restricted random waypoint model and one with the SUMO, the messages devaluate
according to the function ±2 (see Formula 3) and the popularity of the generated messages is 0:2.
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Figure 4: Best response
In Figures 5(a) and 5(b), the results of simulations are plotted in an extended form. In these ﬁgures the
payoff of player null (vertical axis) is plotted against the chosen strategy of player null and other players
(horizontal axes). The best response was calculated by these values in the following way: Player null always
selects the strategy where the payoff is maximal besides ﬁxed strategy of the other players. Recall that the
other players choose always the same strategy. The best response is denoted by stars in Figure 5.
As one can see, the payoff of player null intensively falls down if player null does not cooperate (s = 0)
or surprisingly, if it is too altruistic (s = 1). The nodes are encouraged to carry messages when the barter
mechanism is used, because their goodput is higher if they do so (even if they are not directly interested in
those messages). However, if the U-nodes are too altruistic and value the secondary messages as high as
their primary messages, they help the other U-nodes (as it can seen also in Figures 5 with generally increas-
ing payoff of player null when the other U-nodes are altruistic), but they suffer from goodput decrease.
To understand the reasons, we created some statistics during the simulations concerning the message
exchange number and type. In Figure 6(a) we plotted the number of all message exchanges against the
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Figure 5: Gain
strategies of player null and other players, and also classiﬁed the downloads by the type of the downloaded
message (primary or secondary), these are plotted in Figure 6(b) and 6(c), respectively.
According to two message types (primary and secondary), there are three types of message exchanges
between two U-nodes: 1) primary-primary, when two connected U-nodes download primary messages from
the other, 2) primary-secondary, and 3) secondary-secondary; and there are two other types of message
exchanges between U-nodes and T-nodes: 4) primary and 5) secondary message download. These are
plotted in Figures 7(a), 7(b), 7(c), 7(d), and 7(e), respectively.
Note that there are message downloads, when the nodes download primary or secondary messages
directly from T-nodes. The strategy of the players also effect the rate of message downloads from T-nodes
as the more cooperative the U-nodes are, the more cases are when a U-node u meet another U-node v who
forwards the message before the U-node u meets the T-node which have generated the message. We did not
place the results in this document, because the effect on the direct download is marginal.
The Figure 6(a) shows that the message exchange deliberately decreases when the U-nodes do not
cooperate at all. When the U-nodes do not cooperate, they also reach lower goodput, because the messages
disseminate slower in the network than in the cases when the U-nodes cooperate (s 6= 0).
However, the U-nodes also reach lower goodput if they are too altruistic. The reason is the following:
As one can see, when a player increases its value of strategy (the willingness of prefering some secondary to
some primary messages), the number of obtained primary messages decreases while the number of obtained
secondary message increases, whereas the number of message exchange does not vary appreciably (not
taking into account when the U-nodes do not cooperate at all). This shows that the U-nodes following
altruistic strategy do not utilize the investment of downloading secondary messages, but download more
secondary ones.
To conclude the result of simulations, we can state that the strategy which is most beneﬁcial individually
–the NashEquilibirium of the barter game– ares valuesthat are near to0, butnot equalto0. Therefore, it is
beneﬁcial to help the other nodes (s 6= 0) carrying their messages when the nodes exchange messages only
in fair manner. However, if they are too altruistic, they download primary messages with less probability,
and their goodput decreases.
In Figures 9(a) and 9(b), the network goodput is plotted against the popularity attribute of the generated
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(c) Downloading number of secondary messages
Figure 6: Statistics
messages with restricted random waypoint and SUMO mobility model, respectively. It was done also in
Figure 3, but these ﬁgures are supplemented with the network goodput in Nash Equilibrium of the barter
game. As it can be seen, the barter mechanism eliminated the selﬁsh carrier effect, however the implicit
cost degrades the goodput in cases where the messages are generated with higher popularity attribute. The
implicit cost is a system property, therefore it cannot be compensated.
The Figures 9(a) and 9(b) clearly show that the barter mechanism increases the network goodput in the
networks where the popularity value of generated messages is low, while it does not decrease the goodput
when the message popularity is high. Furthermore, when the popularity value is low the network goodput
is as high as the optimal network goodput.
3.5 Supplement using anti-spam techniques
In Section 2.4, we mentioned some anti-spam techniques that suits to BIONETS networks. Here, we show
how this techniques can be involved to encourage the dissemination of valid messages and to slow down
the dissemination of spam messages.
Recall that the U-nodes before exchanging messages they determine an order of messages that they
want to download. They take into account the age and the type of the messages. Basically, we deﬁned two
types: primary and secondary. The secondary messages usually have less value than the primary messages,
they are rescaled with the secondary/primary ratio (0 · SP · 1) chosen by each U-node. However in
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the ordering the spam marks can also be considered. If a U-node marked a message as a spam, the other
party rescale the massage value with spam/primary ratio (SPAM;0 · SPAM · 1). Typically, the
spam/primary ratio is less than secondary/primary ratio (SPAM · SP) because the barter value of a spam
is less than a valid message that a node is directly not, but the other nodes may are interested in. Note that
the anti-spam algorithms sometimes mark messages even if they are valid. For this reason, it may be worth
to download a message in spite of the fact that another U-node marked as a spam.
The U-nodes can be encouraged to use spam markers (which has low false negative and false positive
rate) with interrupting the connection after downloading a message that seems to be a spam, but the other
party have not marked. In that case, if a U-node uses an anti-spam algorithm which has a high false
negative rate (marks the spam messages with low probability), the other parties will interrupt the connection
frequently. Hence, the U-node will not able to download valid messages from the other parties. In contrast
to this, if a U-node uses an anti-spam algorithm which has a high false positive rate (marks valid messages
as a spam with high probability), it interrupts connections with high probability even it will not be able to
obtain valid messages.
4 Conclusion
In this Deliverable, we studied data dissemination from a Denial-of-services point of view. In the ﬁrst
part of the Deliverable, we analyzed the data dissemination protocols introduced in the BIONETS project.
We concluded that an adversary may have impact on data dissemination, however this impact is marginal
comparedtothe potential impactof selﬁsh nodesthat denyto forwardmessageswhen theyarenot interested
in them. The reasons are that the network is large and the message dissemination protocols are completely
distributed. Therefore, to prevent the spreading of messages, the adversary must be physically present at
many locations, which is almost infeasible. From an other point of view, an adversary may inject fake
messages into the system to slow down the dissemination of valid messages but with anti-spam techniques
based on the analysis of the message contents, used also in the Internet, it is easy to prevent the spreading
of fake messages. We identiﬁed the potential selﬁshness of the U-nodes as the main source of Denial-of-
Service, and hence we focused on discouraging selﬁshness in the data dissemination process.
We proposed a new data dissemination approach, where the users trade in messages based on barter,
and they can download a message from another user only if they also give a message in return. We analyzed
out proposed solution using game theoretic techniques. We showed that it is worth for the users collecting
and disseminating messages even if they are not interested in them, which means that our approach indeed
discourages selﬁshness. The results show that, in practical scenarios, the message delivery rate considerably
increases, if the U-nodes follow the Nash Equilibrium strategy in the proposed mechanism compared to the
data dissemination protocol when no encouraging mechanism is present.
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Figure 7: Message exchange statistics
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Figure 9: Final results
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A Convergence of the goodput
In this section, we prove that the goodput of the nodes converges to a limiting value. This can also be seen
in Figure 10 where the goodput of some randomly chosen U-nodes is plotted against the time. In Figure 11,
the average goodput and its dispersion of all U-nodes is plotted against the time. After this analysis, we can
state that the goodput obtained after a ﬁxed number of time steps in simulation is the steady-state goodput.
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s(t) = fB1(t);B2(t);:::;BN(t);
Z1(t);Z2(t);:::;ZN(t);
H1(t);H2(t);:::;HN(t)g
(11)
where
² N is the number of nodes
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² Bi(t) = [mi1;mi2;:::] is the buffer of node i, where the messages are stored.
² Zi(t) 2 f¤;mg is message stored in the memory of the T-node i, where ¤ denotes the case when no
message is stored at time t, otherwise m stands for the generated message, which arrives from the —
in principle — inﬁnite space of messages.
² Hi(t) is the position of node i on the ﬁeld F.
We consider the ﬁnite state Markovian model in what follows.
Note, that the state space can be described by a deterministic mapping:
s(t + 1) = F[s(t);
r1(t + 1);r2(t + 1);:::;rN(t + 1);
r0
1(t + 1);r0
2(t + 1);:::;r0
n(t + 1);
r00
1(t + 1);r00
2(t + 1);:::;r00
M(t + 1)]
(12)
where
² ri(t + 1) is a random element used as an input by the algorithm to calculate the next step of node i
(1 · i · N) on ﬁeld F at time t + 1
² r0
i(t+1) is a random element used as an input of message generation of message node i (1 · i · n)
at time t + 1.
² r00
i (t + 1) is a random element used as an input of the node pairing in meeting point i (1 · i · M).
The random numbers are generated independently of the time.
Note, that the state transition mapping is time independent. The sequence of state random variables
S(0);S(1);:::;S(t);::: constitutes a discrete time homogenous Markovian chain. The transition matrix
of the Markov process can be derived from Formulae 11 and 12.
As one can see the state space of the Markovian model described above is inﬁnite, however with some
feasible assumptions the model can be converted to a ﬁnite state model.
² Note that the memory of T-nodes was assumed to be unlimited in the whole Deliverable, however an
upperbound can be deﬁned. Recall that the U-nodes delete the messages if the message is older than
T time step. Let the number of T-nodes be g. The greatest number of messages is generated if all
the message nodes generate a new message in each time step. A message disappear from the system
after T time steps. Therefore, the greatest number of messages that a node may store is L = g ¢ T.
Hereby, Bi(t) = [mi1;mi2;:::;miL].
² In the Markovian model described above, the m messages arrive from inﬁnite space as there was no
restriction for it. However, it is feasible to assume that the length of the digital contents that the nodes
exchange is limited, let us assume to be l. In that case, the size of the message space is 2l.
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A Markov-chain is ergodic, if the following limiting value exist:
lim
n!1
P
(n)
ik = Pk
these are independent of i and
1 X
k=1
Pk = 1
As the classic theorem of Markov chains claims, a ﬁnite state homogenous Markovian chain is ergodic,
if it is irreducible and aperiodic. Particularly, there is a time step t and a state j, such that state j can
be reached from arbitrary initial state i with positive probability with time step t. The convergence to
limiting distribution Pj is exponential, which means the following: let P
(t)
ij denote the probability, that the
Markovian chain starting from state i arrives at state j with t steps, furthermore let denote the stationary
probability of state j, the difference jP
(t)
ij ¡ Pjj decreases exponentially when t tends to inﬁnity (Theorem
of Markov). In this case, uniform exponential bound exists for difference jP
(t)
ij ¡ Pjj independently of j.
In our model, the proof of the condition for ergodicity is the following: Assume the system is in an
arbitrary state. We select a state k, let this state be the following, the buffer of the ﬁrst node contains a
single fresh message, while all other buffers are empty. Such a state can be produced the following way:
First we empty all the buffers: the users move or stagnate at a ﬁxed position such a way they escape
meeting message sources. As the time passes the aging messages drop out from the buffer. Then the ﬁrst
node approaches a message source where it receives a message.
As it is shown above, our system is ergodic. Therefore, the convergence is exponential to the limiting
distribution. The distribution of the stationary state is approached at exponential rate. As Equation 13
shows, the converge of the expected value derived from the state of the system — denoted by Ef(S(t)) —
is also exponential.
Ef(S(t)) =
X
k=1
f(Sk)Pk(t) ¡ ¡ ¡ !
t!1
Ef(S) =
jHj X
k=1
f(Sk)Pk (13)
The goodput of a node until time step t — as it is already described in Formula 5 — is:
Gi(t) =
Pt
tj=0 Ài(tj)
Pt
tj=0 M
p
i (tj)
(14)
where the Ài(t) is the gain that node i received in time step t, and M
p
i (t) is the number of primary messages
of node i generated in time step t.
As one can see, the goodput depends on the transient state of the system also, not just on the stationary
state. In what follows we show that the effect of the transient state become negligible and fades away with
exponential rate if the simulations run appropriately long.
Gi(t) =
Pt
tj=0 Ài(tj)
t Pt
tj=0 M
p
i (tj)
t
(15)
Pt
tj=0 M
p
i (tj)
t
» = ³ ¢ % ¢ g (16)
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where ³ is the popularity value of the generated messages, % is the rate of message generation, and g is
the number of T-nodes. As one can see, in Equation 16, the denominator of goodput normalized by t is
independent of time t.
Let the nominator of the goodput be the Ef(S(t)):
Pt
tj=0 Ài(tj)
t
=
t0 ¡ 1
t
0
@ 1
t0 ¡ 1
t
0¡1 X
tj=0
Ài(tj)
1
A +
t ¡ t0
t
0
@ 1
t ¡ t0
t X
tj=t0
Ài(tj)
1
A (17)
t0 ¡ 1
t
¡ ¡ ¡ !
t!1
0 and t ¡ t0
t
¡ ¡ ¡ !
t!1
1 (18)
Ef(S) = lim
t!1
1
t ¡ t0
t X
tj=t0
Ài(tj) (19)
Gi = lim
t!1
Gi(t) =
Ef(S)
³ ¢ % ¢ g
(20)
As we showed in this section, the system reaches its stationary state with exponential rate. Even though
the goodput depends also on the transient state the effect of it is negligible after appropriately long sim-
ulation run as the effect of transient states fades away with exponential rate. By empirical observation, it
is appropriate to consider the goodput after time step 3000 and the goodput will not change in the future
considerably.
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